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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 23, 1982, CBS Television broadcast a 90-minute documen-
tary entitled "The Uncounted Enemy: A Vietnam Deception." The major
theme of the documentary was the contention that General William C. West-
moreland had deliberately distorted data regarding enemy troop strength in
order to mislead President Johnson, Congress, and the American public
about the Vietnam War. In response to the documentary, General West-
moreland filed what was to become a well-publicized defamation suit against
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. Colgate University
1973; J.D. Harvard Law School 1976. The author wishes to thank Virginia A. Watts,
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CBS and three individuals involved in the broadcast.' Three years later, after
extensive discovery, eighteen weeks of trial, and several million dollars in
attorneys' fees,2 the suit was settled without any money changing hands. The
parties issued a joint statement agreeing that "the court of public opinion,"
rather than a court of law, would be the appropriate forum for deciding
who was right in the case.'
On October 5, 1981, the Washington Post ran an item in its "Ear"
gossip column reporting a "rumor" that former President Jimmy Carter had
bugging equipment placed in Blair House while President-elect and Mrs.
Ronald Reagan were living there.' The former president demanded a retrac-
tion and apology from the Post. After an investigation and some reposi-
tioning,' the Post published a complete retraction and apology on October
23, 1981, just eighteen days after the original story had appeared. 6 As a
consequence, former President Carter dropped his plans to sue the Post for
libel . 7
These two cases, both involving well-known public figures and major
news organizations, represent opposite extremes in the handling and reso-
lution of defamation problems. 8 Between the Carter and Westmoreland cases
lie a wide variety of defamation disputes. Most of these cases achieve far
less notoriety and involve plaintiffs and defendants enjoying far less popular
recognition than the principals in these two cases. The wide variety of def-
amation cases suggest an almost equally wide variety of mechanisms which
might be used to resolve these disputes.
1. Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The case
was repeatedly referred to in the press as a "$120 million suit," based on General
Westmoreland's ad damnum figure. Of course, calling it a "$120 million suit" does
not make it a $120 million suit.
2. Attorneys' fees and other costs associated with the case are estimated to
have run from seven to nine million dollars. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1985, at Al, col.
6.
3. Id.
4. Washington Post, Oct. 5, 1981, at DI, col. 1.
5. The Post first maintained that there was a distinction between reporting
the existence of a rumor and reporting fact, stating that the rumor was "utterly
impossible to believe." F. Y.L, Washington Post, Oct. 14, 1981, at A24, col. 1. Mr.
Carter is said to have found this statement both baffling and unacceptable. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1981, at B16, col. 1.
6. Washington Post, Oct. 23, 1981, at Al, col. 5.
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1981, § 1, at 26, col. 1.
8. Throughout this article the generic term, defamation, will be used to
describe both libel and slander.
Because the Westmoreland case was settled prior to verdict, it lacked one
expensive and time-consuming element present in many defamation cases-the appeal.
Empirical studies have demonstrated an unusually high rate of appeals in defamation
cases, with media defendants appealing virtually all adverse verdicts. Franklin, Good
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This article will explore several mechanisms for the resolution of defa-
mation cases. It will first review problems of substantive law which present
obstacles to the fair and efficient resolution of these disputes. It will then
explore some substantive law reform proposals which may expedite the fair
and rational resolution of these disputes. Finally, the article will suggest some
private dispute resolution processes which may advance the parties' goals,
with or without substantive law reform. While a large number of defamation
disputes involve non- media defendants, 9 the article will focus upon disputes
involving news organizations. The article will also examine empirical data
suggesting that much of the financial and psychological expense of defa-
mation litigation is unwarranted in light of the goals of the parties.
The article will develop a three-fold thesis, which may be summarized
as follows:
(1) Defamation is a field in which legal rules and gamesmanship have
frequently obscured the interests of the parties.
(2) Both substantive law reform and the use of alternative dispute res-
olution techniques might result in major strides to correct this problem.
(3) There will remain some cases in which resort to the jury trial may
be the most appropriate means of resolving defamation disputes.
II. PROBLEMS WITH SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Problems with the substantive law of defamation have been the subject
of a great deal of prior discussion and writing. 10 Without reinventing the
wheel, I will summarize what I feel to be the most prominent problems.
A. The Federal/State Law Hybrid: A Patchwork Quilt
A major set of problems in defamation law arises out of a phenomenon
almost unique to this body of law. Because of the first amendment consid-
9. Professor Marc A. Franklin's study of 534 reported defamation cases from
1976 to 1979 revealed that 69% involved nonmedia defendants. Franklin, Winners
and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Litigation, 1980 ABF RES. J. 455, 465.
A more recent study, however, reports that "about seven of every ten libel cases
involve members of the news media." Bezanson, Cranberg and Soloski, Libel Law
and the Press: Setting the Record Straight, 71 IowA L. REV. 215, 218 (1985). A
comprehensive report of the Iowa study's findings is to be published in a forthcoming
book. Findings cited herein are from a preliminary report.
10. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV.
422 (1975); Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making,
61 MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation:
Attacking the Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501
(1981); Franklin, supra note 8; Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to
Damages as a Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U.L. REV. 375 (1981); Lewis, New
York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to the Central Meaning of the
1986]
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erations described in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" and its progeny, 12
the federal courts have intervened to juxtapose federal constitutional consid-
erations on a body of law which (like most of tort law) had previously been
viewed as a matter of state concern. State defamation law (which remains
the substantive base upon which the constitutional considerations have been
superimposed) is frequently archaic, even quaint. For example, the libel/
slander distinction, which developed at a time when ecclesiastical courts wielded
wide jurisdiction and the printing press furnished the only means of mass
communication, is ill-suited to today's forms of expression. 1 The language
of defamation law has a baroque ring to it, with rococo terms such as
colloquium, inducement, and innuendo. Of course, the most confusing of
terms continues to be "malice," a term that, due to constitutional consid-
erations, has taken on special meaning.1
4
As archaic and confusing as the state common-law doctrine (supple-
mented by state statutory enactments) has been, it is the past twenty-two
years of federal constitutional developments which have generated the great-
est confusion in the law of defamation. Subsequent to the seminal Times
case, the U.S. Supreme Court moved through a period of shifting standards,
exemplified by plurality opinions in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts5 and
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 6 Then, in its 1974 decision in Gertz v.
First Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 603 (1983); Comment, Reply and Retraction
in Actions Against the Press for Defamation: The Effect of Tornilo and Gertz, 43
FoDHAm L. REv. 223 (1974).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court held
that first amendment principles require that a public official bringing a defamation
action must prove that a defamatory statement was made with "actual malice"-
i.e., known falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity-in order to recover. Id.
at 279-80.
12. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Herbert
v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984); Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss
Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
13. Courts have struggled to apply the libel/slander distinction to media such
as radio, television, and motion pictures. See, e.g., Gray v. WALA-TV. 384 So. 2d
1062 (Ala. 1980). Shor v. Billingsley, 4 Misc. 2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct.
1956), aff'd, 4 A.D.2d 1017, 169 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1957), appeal denied, 5 A.D.2d 768,
170 N.Y.S.2d 976 (1958); White v. Valenta, 234 Cal. App. 2d 243, 44 Cal. Rptr. 241
(1965). In some instances, state legislatures have intervened by enacting statutes ad-
dressing this issue. E.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 46 (West 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
02-03 to-02-04 (1981).
14. Because of an unfortunate choice of language by the United States Su-
preme Court, judges, juries, lawyers, and law students have for twenty-two years
struggled with the distinction between "common law" (or "garden variety") malice
and "actual malice" as defined in the Times case. In retrospect, the term "scienter"
(used in fraud and securities cases) might have been a better choice, because the Times
standard is concerned with the defendant's knowledge, rather than her motive.
15. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
16. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
[Vol. 1986
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Robert Welch,'7 the Court appeared to offer a definitive statement of con-
stitutional doctrine in this area. Gertz indicated, inter alia, that the "actual
malice" standard of Times would apply not only to public officials, but to
"public figures" as well.' 8 Subsequently, however, it was discovered that the
very definition of "public figure" would be the subject of much litigation,
again requiring definition and redefinition by the United States Supreme
Court. ,9
Recent years have seen a series of Supreme Court cases indicating dis-
comfort on the part of certain members of the Court with the "actual malice"
standard. The decisions in Time, Inc. v. Firestone20 and Hutchinson v.
Proxmire2l suggested a narrowing of the definition of public figure; in Her-
bert v. Lando22 the Court broadened plaintiffs' access to the newsroom in
light of the evidentiary burden under the "actual malice" standard. Occa-
sional victories for media defendants23 suggest that the Supreme Court has
yet to arrive at a clear consensus on the constitutional implications of def-
amation cases. At this stage, however, it is fair to question whether a majority
of the Court would have concurred in the "actual malice" standard were
the Times case before the Court today. 24
The latest source of confusion is the case of Dun & Bradstreet v. Green-
moss Builders,2 5 decided in June, 1985. There, jury instructions allowed a
business to obtain compensatory and punitive damages against a credit re-
porting agency without a finding of "actual malice.' '26 The Gertz decision
17. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
18. Id. at 342, 343.
19. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448 (1976). Lower federal courts have also grappled with the category of
"limited purpose public figure." See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1136 (1983); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l,
639 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir. 1981); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, 627 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 598 (1980); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d
1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978); Ratner v. Young, 465 F.
Supp. 386 (D.V.I. 1979); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C.
1975).
20. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
21. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
22. 441 U.S. 153 (1979); see infra text accompanying note 94.
23. E.g., Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986); Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
24. The Burger Court's treatment of the "actual malice" standard of N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan parallels the same Court's treatment of the exclusionary rule of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603
(1982); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S.
291 (1980); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682
(1972); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In both instances, a Court which
felt uncomfortable with a Warren-era rule narrowed the application of that rule while
stopping short of overturning the rule entirely.
25. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
26. Id. at 2942.
5
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prohibited the award of presumed or punitive damages in the absence of
"actual malice." ' 27 In Dun & Bradstreet, however, the Court upheld the award
below, stating that punitive damages may be recovered in the absence of
"actual malice" when the defamatory statement does not involve a "matter
of public concern." ' 28 The Dun & Bradstreet case indicates a further trimming
back on Times and Gertz principles, and it also adds a new layer of potential
confusion. Now, courts, juries and litigants must wrestle with the public/
private figure distinction of Gertz, as well as the determination of whether
the subject of the defamatory statement is a matter of public concern. 29
Regrettably, the decision involves the courts in yet another inquiry, this one
to determine whether the content of a defamatory statement is worthy of
constitutional protection.30
The sensitivity to first amendment concerns expressed in Times and Gertz
are welcome developments. However, the uncertainty and confusion created
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
28. Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S. Ct. at 2946. Because the Gertz case "involved
expression on a matter of undoubted public concern," Justice Powell's plurality
opinion in Dun & Bradstreet asserted, "We have never considered whether the Gertz
balance obtains when the defamatory statements involve no issue of public concern."
Id. at 2944. Justice Brennan, however, felt that the issue of presumed and punitive
damages had been fully disposed of in the Gertz opinion. Id. at 2957 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
29. Nowhere does Justice Powell's plurality opinion define "matter of public
concern," a point made in Justice Brennan's dissent. Id. at 2929 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting).
30. Justice White's concurring opinion not only expresses dissatisfaction with
Gertz (a thought echoed in Chief Justice Burger's concurrence), but states, "Although
Justice Powell speaks only of the inapplicability of the Gertz rule with respect to
presumed and punitive damages, it must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind
of fault on the part of the defendant is also inapplicable in cases such as this." Id.
at 2953 (White, J., concurring). This statement suggests yet another area of uncer-
tainty for future cases.
Fortunately, the Court declined to base its decision on a distinction between
media and non-media defendants, as had been suggested by the Vermont Supreme
Court. See Greenmoss Builders v. Dun & Bradstreet, 143 Vt. 66, 461 A.2d 414 (1983),
a'ffd, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985). Such a distinction would have created an intolerable
caste system with respect to first amendment rights. See Note, Mediaocracy and
Mistrust: Extending New York Times Defamation Protection to Nonmedia Defend-
ants, 95 HA.v. L. REV. 1876 (1982). This is small solace in light of the distinction
regarding the subject matter of the defamatory statement created by the Court's
decision.
The Court's more recent Hepps decision, which placed the burden of proof of
falsity on defamation plaintiffs, should generally be viewed as a positive step in terms
of both recognition of first amendment rights and logical application of legal prin-
ciples. See infra text accompanying notes 52-58. The Hepps holding, however, was
explicitly limited to actions against media defendants for speech of public concern.
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1564 (1986). Thus the public/
private concern distinction of Dun & Bradstreet and the potential for a media/non-
media distinction remain real.
[Vol. 1986
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by over twenty years of constitutional litigation in defamation cases are less
welcome."a The result of these cases is a constantly changing patchwork quilt
of state land federal statutory and decisional law with little consistent un-
derlying theory.
B. Dealing with Uncertainty
Uncertainty in any area of the law renders outcomes of disputes less
predictable. In the view of some commentators, the unsettled state of def-
amation law hampers the development of alternatives to litigation.3 2 This is
an accurate, if incomplete, appraisal. The uncertainty of legal results is likely
to serve as an obstacle to settlement only if the parties and their counsel are
willing to allow the parameters of settlement to be dictated by a prediction
of legal results. However, replication of the predicted legal outcome need
not be the sole agenda of the parties and their counsel. While the parties to
defamation disputes obviously operate in the shadow of the law, they are
still free to invent other more satisfying solutions by focusing on the parties'
interests and needs, rather than focusing exclusively on a legal solution. 33
An empirical study recently conducted at the University of Iowa (here-
inafter the "Iowa study") indicates that "libel plaintiffs do not sue for the
sole purpose of obtaining a judicial remedy for reputational harm. They
mainly sue to restore their reputation by setting the factual record straight,
and this objective is accomplished in significant degree independent of the
judicial result in the case.' '3 To the extent that this is true,35 enormous
potential exists for the mutually satisfactory and efficient settlement of dis-
putes at relatively little expense.
31. One commentator has noted, "[Tihe Court, inadvertently, has structured
a bewildering labyrinth where even the mighty Theseus would yield to despair." del
Russo, supra note 10, at 501.
32. Remarks by N.Y.U. Journalism Professor Dick Cunningham and attorney
Bruce Sanford at ABA Seminar, reported in 54 U.S:L.W. 2057 (July 23, 1985).
33. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has written:
In counseling clients lawyers may tell them what remedies are legally possible
... and thus preclude inquiry into alternatives which the client might prefer
or which might be easier to obtain from the other party .... [Siome dis-
putants prefer an acknowledgement that wrong has been done to them to
receiving money. Once lawyers are engaged and the legal system, even if
only informally, has been mobilized, the adversarial structure of problem-
solving forces polarization and routinization of demands and stifles a host
of possible solutions.
Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes by Lawyers: What the Dis-
pute Paradigm Does and Does Not Tell Us, 1985 Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 25,
33.
34. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 9, at 227.
35. Some of the statements made by interviewees of the Iowa study could
have been self-serving. Libel plaintiffs may have preferred portraying themselves as
1986]
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C. Non-Fulfillment of Legal Goals
In addition to the uncertainty regarding the law of defamation, there
are other aspects of legal rules that stand as impediments to efficient settle-
ment of defamation disputes. The Iowa study confirms earlier studies indi-
cating that the Times and Gertz standards present almost unsurmountable
barriers to plaintiffs pursuing defamation claims.3 6 One such study indicates
that approximately ninety-five percent of plaintiffs who bring actions against
media defendants ultimately lose.1 Many plaintiffs who in fact have been
falsely defamed are nevertheless unable to clear their names because they are
unable to prove that the defendant acted with the "actual malice" required
in cases brought by public officials and public figures under Times and
Gertz.3 8
Notwithstanding their high success rate, even those defendants who ul-
timately prevail in defamation cases incur enormous legal fees. Professor
Marc Franklin has observed that the Times "actual malice" standard and
the Gertz fault requirement rarely result in summary judgment. As a con-
sequence, a large proportion of defamation cases proceed to discovery and
jury trial. 39
merely desirous of setting the record straight and not being driven by a selfish desire
for a large jury award. For example, General Westmoreland reportedly rejected, nine
months prior to trial, a joint statement somewhat more favorable to him than that
which he ultimately accepted after four months of trial, by which time much evidence
unfavorable to the General had been introduced. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, § 1 at 1,
col. 3. Still, the Iowa data is intriguing. Most defamatory statements (even those
made by media) reach narrower audiences and involve less controversial matters than
those made in the Westmoreland case, and many defamation plaintiffs might prefer
a quick retraction or clarification to prolonged litigation.
36. See generally Franklin, supra note 9; Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A
Litigation Study, 1981 A.B.F. REs. J. 795.
37. Franklin, supra note 9, at 498. Professor Franklin also reported that 88%
of plaintiffs in non-media cases ultimately lose. Id. The Iowa study reports that the
media win 90% of their cases. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 9, at 218.
38. See Franklin, supra note 8, at 29.
39. Id. at 30. Chief Justice Burger has observed that because "proof of 'actual
malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question .... [it] does not readily lend
itself to summary disposition." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1970).
However, in a case decided this past term, the Supreme Court held that the Times
clear-and-convincing standard of proof of "actual malice" should be taken into
account with regard to the granting of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). It remains to be seen whether this ruling will
result in a significant increase in summary dispositions on behalf of defamation
defendants.
Professor Franklin has also noted that most jury verdicts in defamation cases
tend to be pro-plaintiff, only to be reversed on appeal by the appellate courts. Frank-
lin, supra note 8, at 7. It is only sensible for a defamation defendant to appeal an
adverse jury verdict. Appeals, too, cost money and thus, many defamation defendants
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Because the Times and Gertz requirements fail to protect defendants
from the cost of litigation, it has been suggested that the first amendment
requires complete immunity from liability in cases involving public officials,
public figures, or matters of public concern. 40 However, while fear of the
chilling effect of litigation may be well founded, the prospect of citizens
(whether or not they hold public office) being deprived of any remedy to
protect their good names is no less grim. The ideal remedy would preserve
the right to clear one's name, without chilling the media's ability and desire
to pursue and print a story due to either the threat of no-fault liability or
crippling litigation costs.
While much of the above has been said before,4 1 the Iowa study suggests
yet another reason why the Times and Gertz rules have failed to produce
the desired results. As indicated earlier, most defamation plaintiffs ultimately
lose because the courts find that they have failed to sustain their burden of
proving fault as required by Times or Gertz. As a consequence, "the truth
or falsity of the challenged statement is no longer pertinent to the libel action.
Liability, when found, is as often rested on a finding of abuse of privilege," '42
i.e., a finding that the defendant acted with "actual malice," or (in the case
of private figure plaintiffs) negligence. Thus, "[wihile most plaintiffs lose,
they do so on a technicality of privilege. This affords some plaintiffs the
virtual certainty of a face-saving explanation: what the press said was false,
but they got off on a technicality because they weren't negligent or reck-
less." '43 Plaintiffs can rationalize their failure to win without risking exposure,
while undergoing the perverse pleasure of putting a defendant who has wronged
them through the painful ordeal of a lawsuit." The fact that most plaintiffs
40. This position, advocated by Justices Black and Douglas in the Times case,
was adopted by the American Civil Liberties Union in October, 1982. See Cranberg,
ACLU: Second Thoughts on Libel, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., at 42 (Jan.-Feb. 1983);
see also, del Russo, supra note 10; Lewis, supra note 10.
41. See, e.g., Franklin, supra note 8; Hulme, supra note 10.
42. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 9, at 230.
43. Id. Of course, this is not the first time a constitutional right has been
labeled a mere "technicality."
The Iowa study goes on to say that libel plaintiffs are not deterred from suing
by "the prospect that the alleged falsity of the challenged statement cannot be estab-
lished-that the truth of what was published will be promptly confirmed. This de-
terrent does not exist today, largely because of the constitutional privileges." Id. at
231-32.
44. The Iowa study notes:
Little wonder . . . that plaintiffs whose chief motive may be to legitimate
an unwarranted claim of falsity see litigation as an effective way to do so,
and need not fear that their claim will ever be compromised by a finding
that what was said about them was true. Little wonder that public plaintiffs
whose interest is largely nonfinancial see a libel suit as an effective remedy,
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hire their attorneys on a contingent fee basis (whereas defendants pay by the
hour) is consistent with this thesis. 45
The view that the unpredictability of defamation law results in fewer
out-of-court settlements is at least partially supported by the above findings.
A risk-averse plaintiff motivated primarily by the prospect of recovering
damages might rationally agree to a settlement in light of the uncertainty of
the outcome. However, a plaintiff desirous of clearing her name and/or
punishing a defendant may be willing to risk an uncertain result at trial,
particularly when an adverse result does not serve to reinforce the original
defamatory statement.4
In short, the laudable first amendment goals of the Times and Gertz
decisions are subverted because, rather than protecting media defendants,
the Times and Gertz standards simply produce ambiguous results at great
expense. Meanwhile, plaintiffs about whom false statements have been made
are all too frequently unable to clear their names. We should therefore seek
remedies which provide falsely defamed plaintiffs the opportunity to clear
their names, without producing a chilling effect on the first amendment rights
of media and other potential defamation defendants. Some of these remedies
can be the product of law reform by courts and legislatures. Other remedies
might be fashioned as alternatives to conventional litigation by the parties
and their counsel. The next section of this article suggests reforms that might
be undertaken by courts and legislators. The last section suggests what law-
yers and their clients might do to promote an atmosphere more conducive
to the rational and efficient disposition of defamation claims.
III. CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE LAW
A. Streamlining the Fact-Finding Process Through Use of the Special
Verdict
The principal reform I would suggest is that the fact-finding process in
defamation cases be streamlined through the use of a special verdict requiring
the jury to answer three questions: (1) Did the defendant defame the plaintiff?
(2) Was the defendant's statement false? (3) Did the defendant act with
"actual malice"? The plaintiff should have the burden of proof with respect
to all three of these issues.
The above proposal resembles the special verdict used by Judge Abraham
Sofaer in the recent defamation action brought by former Israeli Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon against Time magazine." In that case, a jury deter-
45. Plaintiffs' risks are low because, as the Iowa study notes, "it is cheap
for libel plaintiffs to sue." Id. at 228.
46. See id. at 232.
47. Sharon v. Time, Itic., No. 83 Civ. 4660 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
[Vol. 1986
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mined that Time had indeed defamed Mr. Sharon when it reported that Mr.
Sharon had discussed revenge with Phalangist leaders shortly before the mas-
sacres of Palestinians at two refugee camps. The jury further found that
Time's statement was false. However, the jury declined to find that Time
had acted with knowing falsity or with reckless disregard for truth or falsity .
4
Both sides emerged from the courtroom proclaiming victory. 49 General Sharon
did in fact succeed in clearing his name (an important political goal from
his perspective), while Time (by virtue of the absence of a finding of "actual
malice") was not required to pay any damages.
Where there has been a false and defamatory statement but no "actual
malice," a special verdict like that used by Judge Sofaer allows the plaintiff
to clear her name while still avoiding the crippling damages that may have
an adverse effect on a defendant's first amendment rights. In the past, com-
mentators such as Professors James Hulme and Marc Franklin have suggested
that defamation plaintiffs be allowed to pursue a remedy in which they could
clear their names without the benefit of damages, where "actual malice" or
negligence could not be shown. While Professors Hulme and Franklin would
have required a plaintiff to elect such a remedy, the special verdict procedure
allows the same result without requiring the plaintiff to forego pursuit of a
damage remedy."
48. It was undisputed that Mr. Sharon was a public figure, and that the
"actual malice" standard was therefore appropriate. The jury added a postscript to
its verdict in which it indicated that Time was careless in its reporting. This would
strongly suggest that the jury would have found Time negligent in the absence of the
•"actual malice" standard. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 1.
49. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at B4, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1985, at
A3, col. 1.
50. See Hulme, supra note 10; Franklin, supra note 8. Justice White also
suggested such a remedy in his concurring opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, 105 S.Ct.
2952 (1985) (White, J., concurring). Long before the Times case, Professor Robert
A. Leflar suggested a retraction or right of reply remedy patterned after Arkansas'
old "lie bill." Leflar, Legal Remedies for Defamation, 6 ARK. L. REv. 423 (1952).
While some of Professor Leflar's observations might appear quaint by modern-day
standards (e.g., his description of judgments of $5,000 or $25,000 as "excess," id.
at 424), and some of his remedies might be outmoded in light of modern constitutional
developments, Prof. Leflar probably should be regarded as the intellectual godfather
of alternative remedies for defamation.
51. Because the special verdict can be required in the context of the traditional
cause of action for libel or slander, very little in the way of fundamental change is
necessary for it to be implemented. Judge Sofaer was empowered to call for a special
verdict under Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State trial judges
could take similar action on their own motion under state rule counterparts to Rule
49.
Elsewhere, state legislatures might act to require a special verdict. While such
a state requirement, if viewed as procedural, could cause Erie problems in cases
litigated in the federal courts, the federal courts would be likely to defer to the state
rule in the absence of a "direct collision" between the federal rule and state law. See
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-53 (1980).
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The above proposal is likely to draw criticism from both sides of the
defamation controversy. Plaintiffs would no doubt object to the requirement
that they bear the burden of proof of falsity. Prior to Times, truth had been
regarded as an affirmative defense with respect to which the defendant had
the burden of proof.5 2 While the Times case placed the burden of proof of
"actual malice" on the plaintiff, it is silent as to the burden of proof re-
garding falsity. Theoretically, a plaintiff could succeed in proving that a
defendant acted in reckless disregard for truth or falsity in publishing a
statement which turned out to be true. 3 The mental gymnastics necessary to
arrive at such a result, however, suggest the adoption of a streamlined fact-
finding process under which proof of falsity should be a burden borne by
the plaintiff.
5 4
The U.S. Supreme Court has adopted this position on first amendment
grounds (at least with respect to cases against media defendants involving
matters of public concern) in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps," decided
52. This was not always so. The adage "the greater the truth, the greater the
libel" was legally accurate until the John Peter Zenger case in 1735. In that case, a
jury disregarded a trial court's instructions by heeding defense counsel Andrew Ham-
ilton's plea to exonerate his client, Mr. Zenger, on grounds of truth. In light of
Zenger's reprieve by jury, it is ironic that the modern libel case often involves a
media defendant who ultimately obtains a judicial reprieve from an unfavorable jury
verdict.
53. Theoretically, a camel can pass through the eye of a needle. Nevertheless,
the continued existence of truth as an affirmative defense, notwithstanding the "actual
malice" requirement of Times or the fault requirement of Gertz, is suggested by
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459
(1976).
54. Judge Sofaer instructed the jury that the plaintiff had the burden ofproving falsity with the same "convincing clarity" required under Times with respect
to proof of "actual malice." The Judge later indicated that he was uncertain of the
proper standard of proof on this issue, and that in the event the jury had returned
with a "no" answer to the falsity question, he would have asked the jury to rede-
termine the issue based on a preponderance standard. Kaplan, The Judge's Post-
mortem of the Sharon Libel Trial, Nat'l L.J., March 18, 1985, at 28. Lacking any
strong feelings as to the "proper" standard of proof on this issue, I would suggest
that a jury might better cope with a uniform standard as to all issues, and therefore
express a slight preference for a convincing clarity standard.
55. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). Hepps was an appeal from a Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision holding that truth remained an affirmative defense for which the
defendant had the burden of proof. Hepps v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 506 Pa. 304,
485 A.2d 374 (1984), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). Several other jurisdictions had
already rejected the presumption of falsity, placing the burden of proof on the plain-
tiff. E.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 338 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1049 (1970), reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 978 (1970); Tiernan v. East Shore
Newspapers, 1 111. App. 2d 150, 116 N.E.2d 896, 899 (1953); Jacron Sales Co., v.
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976); Madison v. Yunker, 180 Mont. 54,
67, 589 P.2d 126, 133 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, Williams v. Pasma, 202 Mont.
66, 656 P.2d 212 (1982). The first of these decisions probably served as the basis for
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this term. Aside from the Court's view that placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff is constitutionally mandated, common sense dictates such an
allocation of the burden.16 While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested
in Hepps that a requirement that a plaintiff prove falsity is tantamount to
requiring the proving of a negative,17 this is not ordinarily true. After all,
who but the plaintiff is in a better position to establish whether a statement
about her is true or false? Who knew better what General Westmoreland
told President Johnson, or what General Sharon told the Phalangist leaders,
than Westmoreland and Sharon themselves? Furthermore, while it remains
theoretically possible to be reckless with respect to the truth and still (largely
through luck) be correct, it strains logic to place the burden of proof of
"actual malice" on the plaintiff and leave the burden of proof regarding
truth or falsity on the defendant.1
8
Plaintiffs are also likely to object to the proposal's adoption of Professor
56. Hepps' limitation to actions against media defendants for statements of
public concern does not preclude the Court, in a future case, from placing the burden
of proof on the plaintiff in all defamation cases. Nor does the decision preclude the
courts or legislature of a particular state from imposing this burden in all such cases
as a matter of state substantive law. Federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction
in those states would be required to abide by the state substantive law rule under
Erie principles. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
It would not be inappropriate for a state to adopt such a rule, given the states'
historic role in the development of tort law, as well as.the Brandeisian view of the
states as laboratories for legislative experimentation. See New State Ice Co. v. Lieb-
mann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. Hepps, 506 Pa. at 318, 485 A.2d at 386, rev'd., 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
58. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Hepps noted that "evidence of-
fered by plaintiffs on the publisher's fault in adequately investigating the truth of
the published statements will generally encompass evidence of the falsity of the matters
asserted." Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 1565 (1986).
The state court opinion in Hepps suggested that in light of the protection given
the newsroom under Pennsylvania's shield law, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5942(a), it was only fair
to maintain the burden of proof as to truth or falsity on the defendant. The Supreme
Court declined to address the permissible reach of such shield laws, stating simply
that it was "unconvinced that the State's shield law requires a different constitutional
standard than would prevail in the absence of such a law." Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at
1565. In an earlier case, however, the Court indicated that media defendants could
not have it both ways, insisting that plaintiffs prove "actual malice" while asserting
a constitutional claim of privilege against newsroom discovery. See Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979). A reasonable balance might be struck by shifting the burden
of proof as to truth or falsity to the defendant only when the defendant insists on
a privilege protecting it from discovery. The abusive discovery feared by the dissenters
in Herbert might thereby be avoided without serious damage to the interests of either
party. See id. at 202 (Stewart, J., dissenting) and 204-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Defense counsel in Hepps argued that the Pennsylvania rule (placing the burden
of proof on the defendant) "constitutes a conscious determination by the state to err
on the side of punishing speech that may be true rather than allowing speech that
may be false to go unpunished." Such a decision, he added, "turns First Amendment
law upside down." Natl. L.J., Dec. 16, 1985, at 44. The Supreme Court apparently
agreed. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. at 1558.
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Franklin's across-the-board requirement of proof of "actual malice" in order
to recover damages. Professor Franklin advocated this standard prior to the
Dun & Bradstreet decision;5 9 I would suggest that notwithstanding Dun &
Bradstreet, state courts and legislatures should adopt this standard in all
cases. There are two major reasons for this suggestion. First, a uniform
standard of fault avoids the difficult factual issue as to whether the plaintiff
is a public or private figure. 6° It also avoids the additional determination
required in some cases by Dun & Bradstreet as to whether the statement
involves a matter of public concern. While Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet
indicate that an "actual malice" standard is not constitutionally required in
all cases, the state is not precluded from adopting such a standard in the
interest of judicial economy. 61
Second, imposition of the "actual malice" standard works no great
hardship in light of the fact that the special verdict allows the plaintiff to
clear her name absent any showing of fault whatsoever. In effect, the plaintiff
receives a trade-off: a no-fault remedy enabling her to clear her name in
public in exchange for a higher standard of fault (at least as to private
plaintiffs) in order to recover damages.
Defamation defendants are likely to object to that aspect of the proposal
which allows the plaintiff to clear her name without any showing of fault.
Some defendants might claim that the special verdict undermines the Times
and Gertz standards, in that it allows for a finding of wrongdoing on the
part of the defendant absent any showing of fault. 62 Furthermore, to place
a jury's imprimatur on the plaintiff's claim of falsity might be likened to
official censure, a threat likely to arouse the first amendment sensitivities of
many. In response, I would contend that the special verdict is consistent with
the policy of Times and Gertz, because it strikes a reasonable accommodation
between the plaintiff's interest in clearing her name and the defendant's first
amendment rights. I suspect that the greatest damage inflicted by a jury
finding of falsity would be to a media defendant's market position, rather
than to its first amendment rights. 61 In the marketplace of ideas, the media
should be no less accountable than those about whom it reports.
59. Franklin, supra note 8, at 36.
60. See id. at 37.
61. Gertz expressly reserved to the states the option of requiring a standard
more strenuous than negligence in private figure defamation cases. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974).
Concern for judicial economy goes beyond the trial stage. The issue as to
whether the plaintiff is a public or private figure often reaches the appellate courts.
See cases collected supra note 18. The Iowa study indicates that sixty percent of all
media libel cases involve some sort of pretrial appeal. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski,
supra note 9, at 230.
62. See Comment, Winning the War Against Self-Censorship: Eliminating
Special Verdicts in Defamation Actions, 90 DICK. L. Rnv. 683 (1986).
63. It has been suggested that a jury is an awkward mechanism to determine
the truth, particularly in politically charged cases. See Lewis, supra note 10, at 620-
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The special verdict may also produce dividends in terms of jury control.
A requirement that juries break down their findings into three discrete, "lin-
ear" determinations" is likely to reduce the incidence of runaway juries
applying their own rules in derogation of the requirements of law. 6 The
potential for juries exacting vigilante justice against unpopular media defend-
ants is thereby curtailed.
The special verdict might also serve as a deterrent to plaintiffs who have
been truthfully defamed, but who hope to "win by suing."' ' A jury's refusal
to find falsity strips away these plaintiffs' ability to claim that they were
falsely defamed, but lost on the "technicality" of constitutional privilege.
In fact, such plaintiffs run the risk that a jury's refusal to find falsity will
serve to reinforce the initial defamatory statement. Indeed, General West-
moreland's settlement with CBS shortly after the Sharon special verdict was
rendered in the same courthouse may have been prompted by the General's
fear that his jury, asked to render a special verdict, would find that CBS's
statements were true. 67
B. Elimination of Punitive Damages
As the number of defamation suits has grown over the past several years,
so has the size of damage awards. 68 Punitive damages have played a major
621. While there may be some truth to this argument, it is something we ask juries
to do all the time. Imposition of the burden of proof of falsity on the plaintiff
(perhaps by a "convincing clarity" standard) provides additional protection for the
defendant.
64. Professor James A. Henderson has, in another context, described as "lin-
ear" those issues which have defined limits upon inquiry and argument. Professor
Henderson has argued that such issues are more easily adjudicated than "polycentric"
issues, which lack such limits. Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat
from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467, 475 (1976).
Time's attorneys were disturbed about the manner in which the special verdict
was delivered in the Sharon case, with several days passing between announcements
of the jury's findings as to defamatory content, then falsity, and finally, absence of
"actual malice." Time was apparently concerned about the public perception of these
announcements as reported piecemeal by the media. Conversation with Robert Mar-
shall, counsel for Time, Inc., in Columbia, Missouri (Nov. 15, 1985). In effect, Time
was concerned about being defamed in the media. This is at least one concern that
it can share with General Sharon.
65. Columnist Anthony Lewis has previously suggested the role special ver-
dicts might play in holding juries to the test of New York Times v. Sullivan. Lewis,
supra note 10, at 617.
66. See Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 9, at 228; see also supra
notes 42 through 45 and accompanying text.
67. The Judge in the Westmoreland case had indicated his intention to utilize
a special verdict similar to that used in the Sharon case. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985,
at 39, col. 1.
68. See Note, Punitive Damages and Libel Law, 98 HARv. L.REv. 847 (1985);
Franklin, supra note 36.
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role in the growth of these awards. 69 First amendment considerations should
have long ago led to the elimination of punitive damages in all defamation
cases. The threat of such damages can result and has in fact resulted in self-
censorship, particularly on the part of small publications and broadcasting
companies . 70 One commentator has recently noted, "Because such media are
a principal source of minority viewpoints, the overly generous assessment of




Punitive damages represent an intrusion of criminal law goals (e.g.,
retribution) into the tort law. Punitive damages are particularly inappropriate
where the defendant's activity has social utility.72 As Prof. David A. An-
derson has stated, "[Plunitive damages simply have no place in a speech
context, no matter what the requisite quantum of fault or the classification
of the potential plaintiff may be." 7 In stark contrast to the strong social
utility associated with the conduct of news organizations (evidenced by first
amendment protection) is the absence of any countervailing interest in pu-
nitive damages on the part of defamation plaintiffs. As compensatory dam-
ages serve to fully compensate the plaintiff for any injury sustained, 74 punitive
damages serve little purpose but to gild the plaintiff's lily. While punitive
69. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 477; Note, supra note 68; Ellis, Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Curley, How Libel Suits Sapped the Crusading Spirit of a Small
Newspaper, Wall Street J., Sept. 29, 1983 at 1, col. 1.
71. Note, supra note 68, at 858. While setting forth the many dangers of
excessive punitive damages awards, the Note nevertheless takes the position that
punitive damages should be allowed in libel cases, but only where both "actual
malice" and common-law malice are shown. Id. For reasons articulated in the text,
I feel that such a rule provides inadequate first amendment protection. See also
Anderson, supra note 10, at 473-79; Lewis, supra note 10, at 617.
72. For this reason, punitive damages are probably inappropriate in medical
malpractice cases as well. See Ackerman, Medical Malpractice: A Time for More
Talk and Less Rhetoric, 37 MERCER L. REv. 725, 745 (1986).
Arguably, little social utility is derived from publications such as the NATIONAL
ENQUIRER and HUSTLER. However, I would be most hesitant to impose a rule re-
garding punitive damages based on anybody's perceived value of the content of any
publication.
The Harvard note suggests the need for punitive damages to redress "the
possibility of systematic undervaluation-the prospect that [the defendant] will not
be held accountable for all his wrongful acts and that, when he is sued, he will not
be made to pay the full value of the harm inflicted." Note, supra note 68, at 852.
I would suggest that such a basis for punitive damages raises serious due process
questions, to say the least.
73. Anderson, supra note 10, at 477. In a similar vein is columnist Anthony
Lewis' comment, "Punitive damages have no place in the defamation law of a country
with a first amendment." Lewis, supra note 10, at 617.
74. This is particularly true in light of the Supreme Court's broad definition
of compensable injuries in defamation cases. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974); Time v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 459 (1976).
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damages may be viewed as a means of compensating plaintiffs for their
attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses, these expenses are best and most
honestly dealt with by labeling them as such and expressly allowing their
recovery after reasonable proof.7 Unguided and speculative awards of pu-
nitive damages are ill-suited to this purpose. 6
C. Payment of Attorneys' Fees
In lieu of punitive damages, attorneys' fees and other costs of litigation
should be awarded to the prevailing party under limited circumstances. While
some commentators have suggested adoption of the British system of award-
ing fees to the winner in all cases,7 7 such a rule might have a chilling effect
on litigation brought in good faith or brought to test the boundaries of the
law. Instead, attorneys' fees should be awarded only where the bad faith of
a party has been demonstrated. I would suggest employment of the following
objective criteria to determine bad faith.
First, attorneys' fees should be awarded to the plaintiff where all three
elements of the special verdict 8 have been established. Proof not only of
defamation and falsity, but also of "actual malice" indicates that the defend-
ant (by publishing known falsehoods or acting in reckless disregard for truth
or falsity) has acted in bad faith and has abused its constitutional protection.
The plaintiff, in the meantime, has surmounted substantial legal obstacles
(including the burden of proof) to obtain favorable verdicts on all three
issues. Compensatory damages alone do not render the plaintiff whole in
light of the substantial cost of litigation. Under present law, punitive damages
are constitutionally permissible where the plaintiff has established "actual
malice." '79 Under this proposal, punitive damages would be replaced by dam-
ages which are demonstrably related to the plaintiff's actual costs.
Second, attorneys' fees should be awarded to the defendant in cases
where the plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendant's statement was
75. Professor Anderson has noted, "If courts desire to compensate plaintiffs
for attorneys' fees and other costs, they should do so directly, not by permitting
punitive damages that may be wholly unrelated to those expenses." Anderson, supra
note 10, at 476.
76. As indicated earlier, the Dun & Bradstreet case eliminated the Gertz re-
quirement of "actual malice" to recover punitive damages where the defamatory
statement did not address a matter of public concern. See supra notes 25-30 and
accompanying text. While there may be less of a constitutional reason to protect
speech from punitive damages in matters that are not of public concern, the Dun &
Bradstreet rule imposes content-based discrimination between types of speech and
creates an unnecessary fact-finding problem which can be eliminated by state legis-
lative or judicial action.
77. See, e.g., Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litigation?,
49 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1963).
78. See supra discussion accompanying note 47.
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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false (the second issue under the special verdict proposal). This is an appro-
priate test of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff because, while the plaintiff
cannot be charged with knowledge as to whether the defendant proceeded
with "actual malice," a plaintiff who prosecutes a defamation action, know-
ing full well that the challenged statement is true, is clearly acting in bad
faith.80 The award of attorneys' fees under these circumstances should further
discourage frivolous suits, the goals of which are often more political than
compensatory. In particular, it should prevent plaintiffs from bringing def-
amation actions in order to "win by suing." 8
In cases in which the plaintiff has succeeded in proving the first two
elements of the special verdict (i.e., a defamatory statement which was false)
but has failed to establish "actual malice," the parties would be left to pay
their own costs. In such a case, neither party can be charged with bad faith. 82
D. What Substantive Reform Will Not Do
It is fair to ask why an article dedicated to alternative dispute resolution
in defamation cases should devote so much space to substantive law reform.
It is the author's belief that present defamation law, well intentioned as it
may be, has resulted in distorted strategies which foster excessive litigation
and inefficient resolution of disputes. The suggested substantive reforms are
designed to create an atmosphere more conducive to the efficient and fair
settlement of disputes. The primary effect of these reforms would be to
discourage frivolous litigation brought by plaintiffs about whom true state-
ments have been made, while allowing victims of false statements to clear
their names. What the above measures are unlikely to do, however, is to
expedite resolution of cases in which the plaintiff has been falsely defamed
but where the defendant has acted in good faith (i.e., without "actual mal-
ice"). It is with respect to these cases that the need for alternative dispute
resolution techniques is the strongest. These cases also present the greatest
80. One possible objection here is the equating of failure to prove falsity with
the conclusion that the defamatory statement was in fact true. One could, in these
cases, condition an award of attorneys' fees on an additional jury finding that the
statement was in fact true. Whether this additional procedure is warranted by the
marginal gains in fairness is open for debate.
81. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
82. I am uncertain as to the proper disposition of attorneys' fees where the
plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jury that the statement was defamatory. At first
blush, an award of costs to the defendant might appear appropriate. However, a
plaintiff might proceed under a good-faith belief that she has been defamed, only to
find that a jury does not consider the statement to be defamatory. The issue could
be resolved by asking the jury to determine whether the statement was true, but I
question whether it is worthwhile to undergo the additional cost of another procedural
step simply to resolve who should pay the costs. Furthermore, the jury may have
determined that the statement was non-defamatory simply because it was one of
opinion, which, according to Gertz, can be neither true nor false. See Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
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likelihood for successful employment of alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
techniques, because presumably, both parties have been proceeding in good
faith. ADR techniques can therefore be used to reconcile differences between
parties and to create an expeditious and fair solution.
IV. THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
The potential for alternative dispute resolution in defamation cases is
highlighted by the Iowa study's finding that most victims of defamation
contact the media before bringing suit in order to set the record straight. As
the authors of the Iowa study have stated,
The significance of the contact with the media is hard to overstate. It means
the press has an opportunity to resolve the dispute before a lawyer enters
the picture and before the complainant may even have given serious thought
to litigation . . .a golden opportunity, you might call it. 3
However, instead of entering into discussions likely to resolve the dispute
(through retraction or correction, for example), publishers of defamatory
statements all too frequently engage in behavior which is likely to flame the
fires of a potential lawsuit. The Iowa study reports that defamation victims
are subjected to newsroom runarounds, stonewalling and outright rudeness.8 4
"In a significant proportion of the cases, the way people were treated when
they contacted the media was a factor in, if it did not fully account for,
their anger and the decision to sue.''85
Why are victims of defamatory statements treated in this manner? The
Iowa study notes the constant time constraints under which most news or-
ganizations labor. The pressure to turn out tomorrow morning's edition
leaves little opportunity to deal with complaints about today's paper.8 6 The
Iowa study also notes a widespread absence of any systematic means of
handling complaints. Defamation victims who call news organizations are
often bounced from one telephone extension to another.8 7 In some instances,
complaints go to the reporter or writer who has a personal stake in the story.
Natural defensiveness, on the part of the writer or organization, is often
likely to interfere with objective consideration of the complaint. This is par-
ticularly true of news organizations, which, understandably, are conditioned
to resist pressure. A siege mentality takes hold, and the defamation victim's
honest effort to clear her name quickly turns into an adversarial confron-
tation 8 In addition, I suspect that many news organizations interpret vir-
tually any complaint as a challenge to their first amendment rights. This
83. Bezanson, Cranberg & Soloski, supra note 9, at 221.
84. Id. at 222-224.
85. Id. at 221.
86. Id. at 222.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 222-23.
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response is unfortunate in those cases where the complaint is motivated by
a legitimate desire to set the record straight through private means of dispute
resolution without judicial interference. The defensive posture assumed when
the first amendment flag goes up, however, can quickly transform the com-
plaint into a lawsuit in which judicial interference is invoked.
The obvious remedy for all of this, as suggested by the Iowa study, is
for news organizations to systematize the handling of complaints, placing
complaints under the responsibility of a person with good human relations
skills and no day-to-day editorial responsibilities. 9 Some news organizations
have established such procedures, hiring ombudspersons as members of their
staffs. In many cases, fielding complaints in this manner will lead to a
retraction or clarification. In cases in which the news organization still does
not feel such action is justified, the careful and considerate manner in which
the complaint is handled may convince the complaining party that a lawsuit
is not the best course of action.
A. Agreeing on How to Disagree
What about those cases in which the complaining parties and news or-
ganizations are unable to agree upon a resolution? I suggest that they might
still agree on how to disagree. It is here where alternative dispute resolution
processes come into play.90 While various ADR devices might be appropriate
here, I suggest that discussions continue between the complaining party and
the news organization through a fact-finding process utilizing a neutral third
party. The neutral can be selected from academia, from an organization such
as the American Arbitration Association, or from some community group.
The most important consideration must be that while the neutral should be
sensitive to both the desire for accuracy and first amendment concerns, she
must not be viewed as having any ties to either the complaining party or
news organizations which would compromise her objectivity and neutrality.
The fact-finder's independence and credibility are of critical importance in
light of the delicate tasks to which she will be assigned. 91
1. "Binding fact-finding"
Fact-finding may proceed in accordance with one of two models. The
first of these models I will call "binding fact-finding." This process may be
89. Id. at 225.
90. Actually, the process of discussion and negotiation carried on between
the complaining party and the ombudsperson may itself be viewed as an ADR process.
91. Judge Harry T. Edwards has expressed concern about engaging neutrals
who lack substantive expertise in the area of dispute. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv.L.REv. 668, 683 (1986). This may
present a problem in defamation cases, where most people with substantive expertise
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viewed as a hybrid of fact-finding and arbitration. Under binding fact-find-
ing, the complaining party and the news organization agree in advance to
be bound and act in accordance with facts found by the neutral fact-finder.
The fact-finder proceeds with a full investigation in which she receives the
full cooperation of the parties. Procedures are informal; 92 information is
produced by the parties on the basis of written or oral requests from the
fact-finder, the contents of which might be suggested by the parties them-
selves. While no formal proceedings are contemplated, the fact-finder may
wish to sit down with all parties present to review facts and present the
opportunity for the parties to again attempt to resolve the dispute on their
own terms before rendering a decision.
The sole objective of the fact-finder's inquiry should be to determine
whether the statement which is the subject of the complaint was true or false.
No inquiry would be made as to any fault or "actual malice" on the part
of the publisher, nor would there be any inquiry as to the motives of either
of the parties. If the fact-finder finds that the statement was truthful, the
complaining party is bound, by prior agreement, to drop the claim. If the
statement is found to be false in any material respect, the publisher is bound
to publish a retraction as phrased by the fact-finder. 93 The fact-finder would
also determine the particulars of the publication, such as time and place.
Upon publication of the retraction, the complaining party would be required
to drop the claim.
Substantial obstacles stand in the way of acceptance of the above proc-
ess. One obstacle is the possibility that defamation victims will be unwilling
to forego litigation in return for the possibility of a retraction. In cases in
which the defamatory statement is found to be false, the defamation victim
is giving up a substantial legal right. In most states, a timely and conspicuous
retraction will serve to eliminate punitive or general damages, but not to
entirely extinguish a defamation action. 94 However, present law grants the
regarding the journalistic process have been associated in some capacity with the
media. Insofar as Judge Edwards' concerns can be satisfied by persons with legal
expertise in the subject area, academia may prove to be a valuable source of knowl-
edgeable neutrals.
92. The procedures will usually depart from those used under traditional for-
mal arbitration.
93. The retraction might be partial or complete, depending on the findings.
I am not sure whether the retraction should be presented as the findings of a neutral
fact-finder (e.g., "A neutral fact-finder has determined that The Daily Planet erred
in reporting that Mayor Meier Meyer has embezzled funds from the Metropolis city
treasury"), or as an unequivocal statement of the publisher (e.g., "Contrary to earlier
reports, Mayor Meier Meyer has not embezzled funds from the city treasury; The
Daily Planet regrets the error).
94. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-184 to -5-186 (1975) (punitives recoverable only if
defendant fails to publish a retraction); CAL. CIv. CODE § 48a (West 1982) (only
special damages recoverable unless retraction demanded and refused); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 95-1-5 (1972) (retraction limits plaintiff to recovery of actual damages); TENN.
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defamation plaintiff no remedy if a false and defamatory statement has been
made without any fault on the part of the publisher. 95 The fact-finding
process suggested above would at least give such a person the benefit of a
retraction. While the special verdict proposal would give the plaintiff the
benefit of a jury declaration of falsity, such declaration would occur only
after substantial (and perhaps prolonged, expensive, and emotionally drain-
ing) litigation and, where the plaintiff is not particularly prominent, a jury
declaration would come with no guarantee that it would be conspicuously
reported to the general public. Thus, defamation victims sincerely interested
in clearly their names might find this fact-finding process attractive.
Thornier problems may hinder acceptance of the proposal by news or-
ganizations. Such organizations might resist the idea of outsiders probing
into their news gathering and editorial processes. However, an investigation
by a neutral fact-finder selected by the parties may be viewed as less intrusive
than that allowed under discovery rules pursuant to Herbert v. Lando.96
Whereas Herbert allowed discovery into the journalist's mental processes in
order to determine whether defamatory statements were published with "ac-
tual malice," the investigation contemplated here would be limited to the
truthfulness of the published material, and would not encompass the jour-
nalist's subjective thought processes. Furthermore, as an informal, voluntary
probe conducted by a private citizen, the fact-finder's investigation would
lack the coercive trappings of newsroom discovery under the aegis of judicial
process.
The most sensitive area of inquiry from the journalist's point of view
would be the fact-finder's investigation into sources for the defamatory state-
ment, some of which might be regarded as confidential. In such an instance,
first amendment considerations should be balanced with notions of fairness.
Where a defamatory statement is based upon information obtained from an
undisclosed, confidential source, the defamation victim is deprived of the
opportunity to confront her accuser. 97 It seems only fair that in such instances
the news organization be given a choice between revealing the source of the
defamatory information or bearing the burden of proof. 98 In the context of
CODE ANN. § 29-24-103 (1980) (plaintiff restricted to actual damages and no punitives
by a retraction if libel was published in good faith); TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 5431
(Vernon 1958) (retraction used to determine extent of actual damages and to mitigate
exemplary or punitive damages).
95. See supra note 30 (a caveat based on Justice White's concurring opinion
in Dun & Bradstreet).
96. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). In Herbert, the Supreme Court held that the first
amendment does not protect a reporter from discovery concerning his thoughts,
opinions, and conclusions with respect to the material he gathers, or about his con-
versations with editorial colleagues. The Court emphasized the heavy evidentiary
burden on plaintiffs in defamation cases. Id. at 170, 176.
97. Indeed, the discerning reader ought to question both the newsworthiness
and the credibility of any statement that comes from an unattributed source.
98. Press advocates might attempt to draw an analogy to the fifth amendment
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the informal fact-finding procedure, this shift in burden of proof would mean
that all reasonable inferences with respect to which the confidential source
could provide information would be made against the news organization until
such time as disclosure was made or the inferences were otherwise rebutted.
Again, because the process would be voluntary and private, the shift in
burden would not be as coercive as placing the burden as to truth or falsity
on the defendant in an action brought under judicial process. Furthermore,
under this process the news organization would receive a quid pro quo for
its candor, in that compliance with the fact-finder's findings would provide
a complete defense. 99 The process would emphasize a frank and open search
for the truth, rather than the "come-and-get-me" attitude often displayed
in the adversary process.1°°
2. "Non-binding fact-finding"
An alternative to the binding fact-finding process described above would
be a non-binding fact-finding process which might be viewed as more akin
to mediation. Under this process, the fact-finder conducts a complete inves-
tigation regarding the defamatory statement, utilizing the procedures already
suggested with respect to binding fact-finding. While the fact-finder again
issues findings with respect to the truth or falsity of the statement, under
this procedure the parties are free to work out their own agreement based
upon these findings. The fact-finder might act as a mediator to facilitate
such an agreement. If the parties cannot work out an agreement, they remain
free to proceed to litigation.
One might pause to consider whether the fact-finder's non-binding find-
ings should have any bearing on subsequent litigation. For example, if the
fact-finder finds that the defamatory statement is false, and the defendant
then fails to issue a retraction, should such failure be probative of "actual
malice"?' 0 ' Such a refusal could be interpreted as a cavalier disregard for
protection which allows a defendant to 'refuse to testify on the basis of self-incrim-
ination, while maintaining the burden of proof on the prosecution. See Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). I am not certain that this is apposite, in light of the
important distinctions between criminal and civil actions, particularly with respect to
discovery of evidence.
99. As indicated earlier, existing retraction statutes merely preclude punitive
or general damages. See supra note 92.
100. Of course, the assertion of one's constitutional rights should not be dis-
missed as mere gamesmanship. Participants in the fact-finding process should rec-
ognize they they may be waiving important rights in the pursuit of other important
interests. See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
101. The Times case apparently left open the question of whether or not a
refusal to retract upon learning of falsity after publication may be considered "actual
malice." 376 U.S. at 286. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A comment
d (1977). But see Franklin, supra note 8, at 31 ("Because the only possible liability
is based on fault at the time of publication, nothing the paper does thereafter in
response to a complainant can be read into its behavior at the time of publication.").
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accuracy and at least probative as to the issue of whether there was "actual
malice" at the time of publication.10 2 Should an offer to retract likewise have
some bearing on the "actual malice" issue? For that matter, should a news
organizations's refusal to engage in this fact-finding process be itself pro-
bative of reckless disregard for truth or falsity (again evidencing a cavalier
disregard for the facts)?
While all of this conduct might be probative as to the existence of "actual
malice," we may nevertheless not wish to burden the fact-finding process
with excess baggage relating to some future trial. It is probably preferable
to promote an atmosphere in which the parties are willing to engage in frank
discussion of the facts, unburdened by considerations as to how the process
might affect their future litigation position. Otherwise, the fact-finding proc-
ess might be distorted into a pre-litigation post parade in which the parties
jockey for position in anticipation of future litigation, rather than a sincere
effort to find the truth and resolve differences.
B. Focusing on Interests
In order for either one of the above ADR strategies to be successful, it
is necessary to redirect the parties to focus on their respective interests, rather
than on their legal rights.103 The victim of a defamatory statement has a right
to a jury trial and, upon sufficient proof, to damages. The media and other
publishers of defamatory statements have a right to first amendment pro-
tection. Focusing exclusively on these rights inevitably leads to a clash in the
courtroom. If, however, we refocus on the parties' interests, a less expensive,
more satisfactory solution may be obtained. The victim has an interest in
clearing her name. The media have an interest in accuracy. Quite frequently,
these interests can be reconciled through the dispute resolution procedures
suggested above. ,04
102. There could be some danger in this, much as there is a danger in inferring
"actual malice" from a newspaper's muckraking policy, as was done in a vacated
decision in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post, 759 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated
and petition for rehearing en banc granted, 763 F.2d 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See
Lewis, Getting Even, N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1985, at A27, col. 5.
103. For some very useful work in this area, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING
TO YES 41-57 (1981); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 33.
104. Professor Menkel-Meadow has suggested that lawyers play a major role
in the transformation of disputes into legal language, thereby ignoring important non-
legal interests. See supra note 33. Elsewhere, Professor Leonard Riskin has described
"the lawyer's standard philosophical map," in which disputants are categorized as
adversaries, one of whom must win, and other of whom must lose, and in which
disputes are resolved through application of some general rule of law. Riskin, Me-
diation and Lawyers, 43 Omo ST. L.J. 29, 43-48 (1982). In defamation disputes,
sophisticated media defendants do not need lawyers to remind them that first amend-
ment rights are at stake. Quite on their own, they may be inclined to translate every
complaint into a first amendment controversy, ignoring other interests such as ac-
curacy and good human relations.
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The fact-finding procedures described above should not be regarded as
a panacea, providing a sure-fire remedy for each and every defamation dis-
pute. Given the wide variety of defamation claims, no single device will act
as a Lydia Pinkham pill, good for whatever ails the disputants. Different
parties and circumstances will call for different solutions as varied as the
imagination of the parties and their counsel. The viability of the fact-finding
processes described above, for example, is largely dependent upon the ef-
fectiveness of retraction as a remedy. Certainly retraction worked as a com-
plete remedy for Jimmy Carter.105 In the former President's case, more people
probably read the retraction than the original Washington Post article. But
does retraction fulfill the same function for someone less prominent than a
former President of the United States? For a less prominent person, even a
conspicuously placed retraction may not fully erase the stigma of the initial
defamatory story. Still, the imperfection of the retraction remedy may be
the price we have to pay for constitutional protection. We are, by now, well
beyond the point where a prior restraint would be invoked so as to entirely
avoid the sting of the initial defamatory statement.,06
V. TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHOICES
The dispute resolution procedures suggested above have obvious short-
comings for both sides of the controversy. I would suggest that in these
shortcomings can be found not just the weaknesses, but also the strengths
of these proposals. Parties to dispute resolution processes must recognize
that resolutions or procedures agreed upon by the parties are likely to involve
compromises not present when a resolution is imposed through adjudication.
What will appeal to some decisionmakers and dismay others is that when a
resolution or, for that matter, a process for resolving disputes is voluntarily
accepted, the parties themselves (and their respective decisionmakers) are held
accountable for these compromises. Those less willing to accept this respon-
sibility will allow the current to carry them over the brink to trial, rather
than plotting a safer (though hardly risk-free) course through calmer waters.
The added autonomy of ADR processes brings responsibility; one cannot
rationalize a bad result by blaming it on a legal technicality or a biased jury.
What decisionmakers should realize is that when they allow the dispute to
be decided through the traditional adjudication process, they are also making
a decision.10 7 That decision, of course, means engaging in a process laden
with pitfalls which, in many cases, are far worse than those which accompany
alternative dispute resolution processes.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
106. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (invalidating
statute imposing prior restraint on defamatory publication).
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A. The Trial Option
There will, however, remain some cases that will and should go to jury
trial. 10 8 Where factual issues remain in dispute, a trial may be inevitable. A
jury may be the most appropriate mechanism for resolving many of the issues
presented in defamation cases.'09 Who but a group of citizens drawn from
the community is better suited to determine whether a statement is to be
considered defamatory? Who but a jury of one's peers is better suited to
definitively clear a name that has been clouded by a defamatory statement?
Certainly a jury trial can be costly. But it may also be cathartic. The
Westmoreland trial, expensive as it may have been, might be seen as a passion
play in miniature, a final chapter of America's most divisive war in over a
century. 10 The courtroom may be viewed as an uniquely American forum
for such a controversy,"' far superior to the blood feud, combat, or ordeal
108. Judge Harry T. Edwards (who, as a law professor, made significant con-
tributions in the field of dispute resolution long before ADR became trendy), has
recently written:
[Miutual understanding and good feeling among disputants obviously facil-
itates intelligent dispute resolution-but there are some disputes that cannot
be resolved simply by mutual agreement and good faith. It is a fact of
political life that many disputes reflect sharply contrasting views about fun-
damental public values that can never be eliminated by techniques that en-
courage disputants to "understand" each other.
Edwards, supra note 91, at 678. Judge Edwards was concerned primarily about
the resolution of public disputes outside the courtroom. However, while defamation
suits are private in form, many such suits take on public importance. A public arena
such as a courtroom is not an inappropriate battleground for such disputes. The
Westmoreland case, because of its entanglement with the Vietnam controversy, is a
prominent example of such a dispute.
109. Professor and columnist Anthony Lewis, among others, has suggested
that a jury is a poor vehicle for making the types of factual determinations made in
defamation cases. Lewis, supra note 10, at 620-21. This brings to mind Winston
Churchill's comment that "democracy is the worst form of government except all
those other forms that have been tried from time to time." Speech, House of Com-
mons, Nov. 1947. I am inclined to attribute similar shortcomings to the American
jury, at least insofar as purely factual determinations are concerned.
110. The Westmoreland case may also be seen as a metaphor for the Vietnam
War. General Westmoreland pursued a matter with questionable prospects, consuming
a great amount of time, energy, expense, and manpower. He nevertheless remained
in the conflict, becoming immersed knee-deep in the "Big Muddy" of litigation. In
the end, with defeat all but assured, he pulled out, declaring victory.
111. Professor Owen M. Fiss has recently written,
To conceive of the civil lawsuit in public terms as America does might be
unique. I am willing to assume that no other country . . . has a case like
Brown v. Board of Education in which the judicial power is used to eradicate
the caste structure. I am willing to assume that no other country conceives
of law and uses law in quite the way we do. But this should be a source of
pride rather than shame.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
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which it replaced.1 2 In the Westmoreland case, a jury trial produced a public
exposition of the facts and an eventual settlement. In our enthusiasm for
alternative dispute resolution, we should recognize the continuing legitimacy
of the trial process and the vital role it continues to play in the resolution
of disputes.
B. Reestablishing Control Over Litigation
As Professor Menkel-Meadow has noted,"' litigation frequently tends
to take on a life of its own. Complaints build into disputes, disputes turn
into cases, and the parties and their counsel get swept along on a mad journey
to the courthouse, losing sight of their original objectives. This phenomenon
is more likely to occur in the "big case," in which an institutional client is
represented by a large law firm. With the decision-making process diffused,
there is less likelihood that any one individual (be it an attorney or client)
will assume responsibility, and litigation tends to snowball, becoming an end
in itself.
Many defamation cases present the above scenario. Defendants are fre-
quently large news-gathering organizations represented by major law firms.
In recent years, there has even been a trend on the part of plaintiffs to engage
large corporate law firms where they will be represented by teams of attor-
neys." 4 In addition, defamation cases often involve important legal principles
which often eclipse personal interests." 5 The lawsuit becomes a battlefield
for vindication of first amendment rights or a campaign against a seemingly
irresponsible press rather than a truth-seeking process.
If, however, the case is periodically reassessed in light of client objec-
tives, matters are less likely to get out of control. Assuming that the over-
riding objective of news-gathering organizations is the accurate reporting of
facts and that the overriding objective of defamation victims is the clearing
of their names, evaluation of defamation cases in light of client objectives
should frequently produce a mutually satisfactory resolution short of trial." 6
In those cases in which pre-trial resolution does not occur, the parties can
at least proceed to trial recognizing that a more satisfactory solution was
unattainable.
112. We should not forget that the jury trial had its origin as an alternative
dispute resolution mechanism. See REMBAR, TIE LAW OF THE LAND 91-140 (1980).
113. See supra note 33.
114. See Franklin, supra note 8, at 12, n.58.
115. The involvement of well-financed public interest organizations and foun-
dations such as the Libel Defense Resource Center and ACLU (on behalf of defend-
ants) and Capital Legal Foundation and American Legal Foundation (on behalf of
plaintiffs) underscores this commitment to broad legal principles. See id. at 12, n.59.
116. In light of modern-day principles of informed consent, I would suggest
that the lawyer owes the client nothing short of a periodic reassessment of the case
in terms of client objectives. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC
7-7, 7-8, 7-9 (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983).
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have seen how substantive defamation law, due to the development
of well-intentioned but confusing and ineffectual rules, has created significant
obstacles to the rational and efficient resolution of disputes. Changes in
substantive and procedural rules may be conducive to the efficient settlement
of disputes, while protecting socially desirable legal rights. In addition, the
parties themselves can take steps to resolve defamation disputes before they
evolve into major litigation. This is best accomplished when the parties focus
on their mutual interests, rather than on their legal rights alone.
Some defamation disputes, because they involve irreconcilable differ-
ences between parties or because they involve issues of a public nature, should
be resolved through litigation. However, the choice to litigate should be a
conscious one, made by informed parties who have decided that it is the best
means of pursuing legitimate objectives. In this respect, lawyers can play
important roles in (1) shaping substantive and procedural law in such a way
that it fulfills legitimate, and only legitimate, objectives, and (2) recognizing
that many parties to defamation disputes are best served by engaging in a
healing process, rather than through legal combat. To pursue a client's legal
rights requires learning and competence; but to recognize and take full ad-
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